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Abstract 
 
The ability to attract and retain talented professors is a distinctive competence of 
world-class universities and a source of competitive advantage. The ratio of top 
scientists to academic staff could therefore be an indicator of the competitive strength of 
the universities. This work identifies the Italian top scientists in over 200 fields, by their 
research productivity. It then ranks the relative universities by the ratio of top scientists 
to overall faculty. Finally, it contrasts this list with the ranking list by average 
productivity of the overall faculty. The analysis is carried out at the field, discipline, and 
overall university levels. The paper also explores the secondary question of whether the 
ratio of top scientists to faculty is related to the size of the university. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The single most important distinctive competence of world-class universities is 
probably their ability to attract and retain highly qualified faculty (Salmi, 2009; 
Mohrman et al., 2008). Talented professors attract talented students. They produce 
groundbreaking research results, which in turn attract donations, public and private 
research funds, venture capital and establishment of high-tech companies in the 
territory. The outstanding reputation, abundance of financial resources, and highly 
attractive research environment feed a virtuous circle, leading to a sustained competitive 
advantage over other universities. Competitive higher education systems, such as those 
observed in English speaking nations, are therefore likely to present a number of 
universities with distinctive achievement in quality of education and research. This 
supposition is supported by a glance at the most popular world university “league 
tables”, such as the Academic Ranking of World Universities (ARWU), the Times 
Higher Education (THE) World Academic Rankings, the CWTS Leiden Rankings, and 
the SCImago Institutions Rankings (SIR). Several studies call into question the 
methodology and the relevance of the indicators used in these rankings (Abramo et al., 
2011; Butler, 2010; Dehon, 2010; Turner, 2005; van Raan, 2005). However, Saisana et 
al. (2011), while accepting that the ARWU and the THE should not be used to compare 
the performance of individual universities, demonstrate that their rankings are reliable 
for the top 10 universities. Indeed the top 10 institutions in both the 2015 ARWU2 and 
THE 2015-2016 ranking3 consist entirely of ones situated in the U.S. or U.K., and the 
same also occurs in the 2015 SIR and Leiden size-independent rankings. 
The U.S. and U.K. have experienced an evolution of national policies that favor the 
birth and development of true markets in higher education. In contrast, many European 
nations witness an excess of public control, inhibiting the initiation of competitive 
mechanisms and leading to the development of generally undifferentiated higher 
education systems that are unable to compete at a global level for access to economic 
and human resources (public and private funds, talented students, excellent faculty) 
(Veugelers and van der Ploeg, 2008). Auranen and Nieminen (2010) report that in 
countries such as Germany, Sweden and Denmark, there is still no expectation of 
distinguishing different levels of excellence among universities, due to the almost total 
lack of competition among the actors in the systems. (The present authors observe the 
same situation in Italy.) 
Recently, scientometricians have inquired into the distribution of talented scientists 
among universities. Because top-level scientists contribute more than unproductive ones 
to the overall research performance of universities (Abramo et al., 2013a), logic would 
have it that in competitive systems, top research universities would achieve this status 
from a concentration of top scientists (TSs). However, what is the case in education 
systems with little differentiation? Are the TSs quite uniformly distributed among 
universities? Common sense would lead us to expect this, otherwise the universities 
with a high concentration of TSs would have to experience an even higher concentration 
of unproductive scientists in order to remain undifferentiated, a fact which seems 
difficult to accept. The intention of the current work is to answer this question of the 
distribution of top scientists in undifferentiated higher education systems, taking the 
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Italian case as specific reference. Italy offers a classic example of an undifferentiated 
higher education system, as shown by Bonaccorsi and Cicero (2015), Abramo et al. 
(2012a), and confirmed through a further sophisticated assessment methodology, 
accounting for uncertainty in the measure of research performance (Abramo et al., 
2015a). 
The literature on the distribution of TSs among universities is quite scarce. To the 
best of our knowledge, the only work to specifically focus on this subject is by Yang et 
al. (2015). These authors identify the world’s top scientists and institutions in twenty 
broad research fields, by total counts of citations for publications indexed in the Web of 
Science (WoS) in the period 2008-2011. Their findings are that in the larger fields, more 
than 80% of TSs work at top institutions, although the concentration is less for smaller 
fields such as mathematics and computer science. Other research, tangentially related to 
the topic, has been by Bornmann and Bauer (2015), who rank institutions by the total 
number of highly cited researchers, and by Abramo and D’Angelo (2015), who rank 
universities by the number of highly-cited articles per scientist. 
The current study overcomes what in our view are two major limits of Yang et al. 
(2015). The first concerns the performance indicator used to identify the top research 
institutions. In fact Yang et al. adopt the measure of the total count of citations, but this 
is a size-dependent indicator, which inevitably favors large institutions. In this study we 
employ a size-independent indicator, specifically fractional scientific strength (FSS), 
which is a productivity indicator embedding both the fractional counting of publications 
and their field-normalized citations (Abramo and D’Angelo, 2014). The second limit 
concerns the results under examination. What interests Yang et al. is the whole numbers 
of TSs employed in the top institutions (or the percentages of top scientists out of the 
overall population). Once again, all others equal, the larger the size of the institution, the 
greater the chance of employing the higher number of TSs. We will instead calculate, 
for each university, the ratio of TSs to the overall faculty. This change provides an 
indicator of the competitive strength of the universities, and responds to our first 
research question. 
Further, we will then investigate the specific aspect of the relation between the 
institution’s average research performance and its ratio of TSs to overall academic staff. 
We will also verify the side question of whether there are varying returns to size. The 
analytical approach involves a fine-grained analysis in over 200 research fields, 
meaning that the analysis is ten times finer than that of Yang et al. (2015). Given that 
the intensity of publication varies across fields (Butler 2007; Abramo and D’Angelo, 
2007; Moed et al., 1985; Garfield, 1979), this approach has the particular advantage of 
avoiding distortions due to the coarse aggregation of research fields (Abramo et al., 
2008). 
In the next sections of the paper we describe the distinctive features of the Italian 
higher education system and then present the data and methods used. The final sections 
provide the results of the analysis, leading to the conclusions. 
 
 
2. The Italian higher education system 
 
The Italian Ministry of Education, Universities, and Research (MIUR) recognizes a 
total of 96 universities as having the authority to issue legally recognized degrees. Of 
these, 29 are small, private, special-focus universities, of which 13 offer only e-learning, 
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67 are public and generally multi-disciplinary universities, scattered throughout Italy. 
Six of them are Scuole Superiori (Schools for Advanced Studies), specifically devoted 
to highly talented students, with very small faculties and tightly limited enrolment per 
degree program. In the overall system, 94.9% of faculty are employed in public 
universities (0.5% in Scuole Superiori). Public universities are largely financed by the 
government through non-competitive allocation of funds. Until 2009 the core 
government funding (56% of universities’ total income) was input oriented (i.e. 
independent of merit, and distributed to universities in a manner intended to satisfy the 
needs of each and all equally, with respect to their size and research disciplines). It was 
only following the first national research evaluation exercise concluded in 2006, that a 
minimal share, equivalent to 3.9% of total income, was assigned by the MIUR as a 
function of the assessment of research and teaching. 
Despite interventions intended to grant increased autonomy and responsibilities to 
the universities (Law 168 of 1989)4, the Italian higher education system is a long-
standing, classic example of a public and highly centralized governance structure, with 
low levels of autonomy at the university level and a very strong role played by the 
central state. 
In keeping with the Humboldtian model, there are no ‘teaching-only’ universities in 
Italy, as all professors are required to carry out both research and teaching. National 
legislation includes a provision that each faculty member must provide a minimum of 
350 hours per year of teaching. At the close of 2015, there were 54,800 faculty members 
in Italy (full, associate and assistant professors) and a roughly equal number of 
technical-administrative staff. All new personnel enter the university system through 
public competitions, and career advancement depends on further public competitions. 
Salaries are regulated at the central level and are calculated according to role 
(administrative, technical or professorial), rank within role (e.g. assistant, associate or 
full professor) and seniority. None of a professor’s salary depends on merit. Moreover, 
as in all Italian public administration, dismissal of unproductive professors is unheard 
of. 
The entire legislative-administrative context has created a culture that is hardly 
competitive, yet flourishing with favoritism and other opportunistic behaviors that are 
dysfunctional to the social and economic roles of the academia (Zagaria, 2007; Perotti, 
2008). Abramo et al. (2014) investigated 287 associate professor competitions. The 
analysis showed several critical issues, particularly concerning unsuccessful candidates 
who outperformed the competition winners in terms of research productivity, as well as 
a number of competition winners who resulted as totally unproductive. Almost half of 
individual competitions selected candidates who would go on to achieve below-median 
productivity in their field of research over the subsequent triennium. A more recent 
work (Abramo et al., 2015b) showed that the fundamental determinant of an academic 
candidate’s success is not scientific merit, but rather the number of years that the 
candidate has belonged to the same university as the president of the selection 
committee. Thus, universities are unable to attract significant numbers of talented 
foreign faculty: only 1.8% of research staff are foreign nationals. Over the period 2009-
2013, 3,178 (9.1%) of the 34,862 professors in the Sciences did not publish any 
scientific articles in WoS indexed journals. Another 868 professors (2.5%) achieved 
publication, but their work was never cited. This means that 4,046 individuals (11.6%) 
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had no impact on scientific progress measurable by bibliometric databases.2 This share 
of unproductive faculty has been declining but is still too high, particularly given that 
the legislative structure obligates all professors to conduct research. Indeed, highly 
competitive academic systems typically present instances of distinct “research” and 
“teaching” universities, but in Italy all universities are intended to serve both purposes, 
with all of them staffed by professors who are responsible for both research and 
teaching. 
 
 
3. Data and methods 
 
The intention of our analysis is to provide and examine the ranking all Italian 
universities according to their ratio to total faculty of those professors that rank in the 
top 10% for productivity, out of all Italian professors in the same field. 
We restrict the analysis to those fields where the prevalent form of codification for 
research output is publication in scientific journals, and therefore bibliometrics can be 
applied to measure research performance. For brevity, we call those fields the Sciences, 
and distinguish them from the Social Sciences and Arts & Humanities. In the Italian 
university system all professors are classified in one and only one field, named the 
scientific disciplinary sector (SDS), 370 in all. SDSs are grouped into disciplines, 
named university disciplinary areas (UDAs), 14 in all5. 192 such fields, grouped into 
nine UDAs6, fall in the Sciences. 
Data on the faculty at each university and their SDS classification were extracted 
from the database on Italian university personnel, maintained by the MIUR. The 
bibliometric dataset used to measure performance is extracted from the Italian 
Observatory of Public Research, a database developed and maintained by the present 
authors and derived under license from the Thomson Reuters WoS. Beginning from the 
raw data of the WoS, and applying a complex algorithm to reconcile the author’s 
affiliation and disambiguate the true identity of the authors, each publication (article, 
article review and conference proceeding) is attributed to the university scientist or 
scientists that produced it (D’Angelo et al. 2011). Thanks to this algorithm, we can 
produce rankings of research performance at the individual level, on a national scale. 
In this work we measure the research performance in the publication period 2009-
2013. As said above, the indicator of performance that we use for professors and 
universities is FSS. At the professor level, we calculate FSSP, as follows: 
𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑃 =  
1
𝑡
∑
𝑐𝑖
𝑐̅
𝑁
𝑖=1
fi 
 [1] 
Where: 
t = number of years of work in the period under observation 
N = number of publications in the period under observation 
𝑐𝑖 = citations received by publication i (counted at 31/05/2015) 
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𝑐̅ = average of distribution of citations received for all cited publications7 in same year 
and subject category of publication i 
fi = fractional contribution of professor to publication i. 
The fractional contribution equals the inverse of the number of authors in those 
fields where the practice is to place the authors in simple alphabetical order but assumes 
different weights in other cases. For the life sciences, widespread practice in Italy is for 
the authors to indicate the various contributions to the published research by the order 
of the names in the listing of the authors. So for the life science, we give different 
weights to each co-author according to their position in the list of authors and the 
character of the co-authorship (intra-mural or extra-mural) (Abramo et al. 2013b). If the 
first and last authors belong to the same university, 40% of the citation is attributed to 
each of them, the remaining 20% is divided among all other authors. If the first two and 
last two authors belong to different universities, 30% of the citation is attributed to the 
first and last authors, 15% of the citation is attributed to the second and last authors but 
one, the remaining 10% is divided among all others8. 
A thorough description of the economic theory underlying the operationalization of 
FSS, together with the assumptions and limits of the measurement, can be found in 
Abramo and D’Angelo (2014)9. 
Based on the value of FSS we obtain, for each SDS, a ranking list of all professors. 
We define TSs as those that place from the 90 percentile up. 
To analyze the relation between the ratio of TSs to the faculty and the performance 
of the university, we need to assess the research performance of universities. To do that, 
we first normalize the FSS of each professor to the mean of all Italian productive 
professors in the same SDS, and then average the normalized FSS to overall faculty. In 
formulae, the productivity 𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑈 over a certain period for university U is: 
𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑈 =  
 1
𝑅𝑆
∑
𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑗
𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑅𝑆
𝑗=1
 
 [2] 
Where: 
𝑅𝑆 = number of professors of university U, in the observed period; 
𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑗= productivity of professor j; 
𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅= national average productivity of all productive professors in the same SDS of 
professor j. 
 
 
4. Results and analysis 
 
In this section we prepare and analyze the rankings of universities. After displaying 
our dataset, we calculate the ratio of TSs to faculty for each university, at the SDS and 
UDA levels. We then rank the Italian universities by TS ratio and analyze the 
                                                          
7 Abramo et al. (2012b) demonstrated that the average of the distribution of citations received for all cited 
publications of the same year and subject category is the most effective scaling factor. 
8 The weightings were assigned following advice from senior Italian professors in the life sciences. The 
values could be changed to suit different practices in other national contexts. 
9 The reader may notice that, differently from the formula found in the referenced article, in this work we 
do not normalize the total impact by capital (salary of the professor). The reason is that we want to 
identify the top producers, regardless their cost. 
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distribution of the ratio, in response to our first research question, concerning the 
distribution of top scientists in undifferentiated higher education systems. We follow on 
to investigate whether the size of universities affects the value of the TS ratio (varying 
returns to size). Finally, we contrast the universities rankings by TS ratio and average 
research performance (𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑈). 
Table 1 shows the dataset at the UDA level. For each UDA we report the number of 
universities with at least 10 faculty members, the total number of professors and the 
amount of TSs. We recall that TSs are defined here as those scientists above the 90th 
percentile in the ranking list of all Italian academic staff in the same SDS. The overall 
dataset concerns 64 universities and 34,862 professors, of which 3,571 fall in the 
category of TS. 
 
Table 1: Dataset for the analysis - number of universities, faculty and top scientists in each UDA 
UDA Universities Faculty Top scientists* 
1 - Mathematics and computer science 50 3,268 332 
2 - Physics 43 2,333 237 
3 - Chemistry 42 2,996 303 
4 - Earth sciences 31 1,114 115 
5 - Biology 53 4,971 507 
6 - Medicine 42 10,370 1,062 
7 - Agricultural and veterinary sciences 29 3,076 319 
8 - Civil engineering 36 1,535 158 
9 - Industrial and information engineering 49 5,199 538 
Total 64 34,862 3,571 
* The number of top scientists does not equal exactly 10% of the research staff in each UDA because of 
ties in the ranking lists. 
 
After identifying the TSs in each SDS, through their affiliation we are able to 
measure for every particular university the ratio of TSs to the overall faculty. As an 
example, in Table 2 we report the case of UNIV_45 in the SDSs of UDA 1 
(Mathematics and computer science). About a quarter of the faculty are TSs, however 
the TS ratios in each SDS are uneven: there are no TSs in two out of six SDSs. 
 
Table 2: Ratio of top scientists to overall faculty in each SDS of UDA 1 for the case of UNIV_45 
SDS* Research staff TS ratio 
MAT/02 - Algebra 3 33.3% 
MAT/03 - Geometry 9 44.4% 
MAT/05 - Mathematical analysis 16 0% 
MAT/07 - Mathematical physics 3 0% 
MAT/08 - Numerical analysis 6 50.0% 
INF/01 - Computer science 11 36.4% 
Total 52 23.1% 
* The SDSs with less than 3 professors were excluded 
 
Table 3 instead presents the TS ratios in each UDA and the corresponding national 
rank. In four UDAs, UNIV_45 employs less than 10 professors and the related statistics 
are not shown. The total number of TSs is 47, representing a TS ratio of 19.7% of 
overall faculty in the five UDAs analyzed. Univ_45 ranks in the national top 5% in 
UDA 1 (Mathematics and computer science), and UDA 9 (Industrial and information 
engineering), but below the median in UDA 5 (Biology). In the overall ranking by TS 
ratio, UNIV_45 ranks fifth out of 64 universities. 
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Table 3: Ratio of top scientists to overall faculty in each UDA for the case of UNIV_45 
UDA* Research staff TS ratio National rank Percentile 
1 52 23.1% 3 out of 50 95.9% 
2 38 18.4% 6 out of 43 88.1% 
5 14 7.1% 36 out of 53 32.7% 
8 39 10.3% 16 out of 36 57.1% 
9 75 25.3% 3 out of 49 95.8% 
All 239 19.7% 5 out of 64 93.7% 
* The UDAs with less than 10 professors were excluded. 1 = Mathematics and computer science; 2 = 
Physics; 5 = Biology; 8 = Civil engineering; 9 = Industrial and information engineering 
 
 
Figure 1 plots each university by its TS ratio and the corresponding position in the 
ranking list. With the help of the gaps in the density of the graph we can observe the 
differences in the TS ratios between neighboring universities in the rank. The first four 
universities in the ranking list stand out clearly. Then, starting from the 6th position, the 
TS ratio decreases quite evenly (average difference between neighboring positions is 
0.2% TS ratio). The highest intervals appear between the first and the second, and the 
fourth and the fifth universities in the ranking list, with gaps in TS ratio of 12.5% and 
8.5% respectively. 
 
 
Figure 1 Scatter plot of universities by ratio of top scientists to faculty and position in the ranking list; 
triangles indicate outliers 
 
As a side question, we investigate also whether the TS ratios vary more than 
proportionally with the size of the university. In a previous paper we showed no 
evidence of returns of productivity to size (Abramo et al., 2012c). We take the 
opportunity here to verify whether the same holds true for the TS ratio. Figure 2 shows 
a scatter plot of universities, positioned by TS ratio and the size of faculty. The Pearson 
correlation coefficient is equal to -0.129, demonstrating negligible linear relationship 
between the two variables. The four outliers by TS ratio are small-sized universities, 
each with less than 70 professors in the UDAs analyzed, while the median of the 
distribution is 420 and the maximum is 2642. Calculating the correlation coefficient 
without the top four universities by TS ratio and the largest one by size, the correlation 
remains weak (= 0.226). We now contrast the universities ranking list by TS ratio 
with that by productivity (FSSU). We first show the analysis at UDA level, and then at 
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overall university level. Table 4 presents the comparison for Agricultural and veterinary 
sciences (UDA 7). Here, 55% of universities occupy the same positions in both 
rankings. Although the correlation between the two rankings is very strong (Spearman  
= 0.861), there still occur noticeable shifts in rank for several universities (on average 
13.2%). The maximum percentile shift equals 35.7%, corresponding to a two-quartile 
shift (UNIV_43). 
 
 
Figure 2 Scatter plot of universities positioned by top scientists ratio and faculty size; triangles indicate 
outliers 
 
Table 4: Comparison of university ranking lists by TS ratio and FSSU in UDA 7 (Agricultural and 
veterinary sciences) 
University 
Research 
staff 
TS 
ratio 
Rank FSS Rank 
Rank 
Shift 
Percentile 
shift 
Quartile 
Shift 
UNIV_26 64 25.0% 1 1.175 3 2 7.1 0 
UNIV_8 12 25.0% 1 1.113 4 3 10.7 0 
UNIV_18 93 17.2% 3 1.306 2 1 3.6 0 
UNIV_2 12 16.7% 4 1.016 6 2 7.1 0 
UNIV_12 72 16.7% 4 0.942 13 9 32.1 1 
UNIV_34 184 16.3% 6 1.321 1 5 17.9 0 
UNIV_44 189 13.8% 7 0.981 10 3 10.7 1 
UNIV_49 22 13.6% 8 0.956 11 3 10.7 1 
UNIV_39 15 13.3% 9 0.843 15 3 21.4 0 
UNIV_56 255 13.3% 9 0.956 12 6 10.7 0 
UNIV_29 273 13.2% 11 0.991 8 3 10.7 1 
UNIV_28 64 12.5% 12 1.024 5 7 25.0 1 
UNIV_32 209 12.4% 13 0.988 9 4 14.3 0 
UNIV_62 45 11.1% 14 0.734 17 3 10.7 1 
UNIV_20 195 10.8% 15 1.004 7 8 28.6 1 
UNIV_60 139 8.6% 16 0.817 16 0 0.0 0 
UNIV_35 108 8.3% 17 0.687 20 3 10.7 0 
UNIV_58 105 7.6% 18 0.695 19 1 3.6 0 
UNIV_47 103 6.8% 19 0.731 18 1 3.6 0 
UNIV_17 74 6.8% 20 0.593 24 4 14.3 1 
UNIV_36 75 6.7% 21 0.561 25 4 14.3 1 
UNIV_25 146 5.5% 22 0.530 27 5 17.9 1 
UNIV_38 153 4.6% 23 0.658 22 1 3.6 1 
UNIV_43 73 4.1% 24 0.891 14 10 35.7 2 
UNIV_41 135 3.7% 25 0.600 23 2 7.1 0 
UNIV_13 55 3.6% 26 0.487 28 2 7.1 0 
UNIV_52 64 3.1% 27 0.441 29 2 7.1 0 
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UNIV_57 38 2.6% 28 0.659 21 7 25.0 1 
UNIV_31 18 0.0% 29 0.532 26 3 10.7 0 
Table 5 shows the ranking lists of Italian universities in all UDAs by TS ratio and 
by FSSU. Four universities outperform the others by both TS ratio and FSSU: they are a 
private university focused in medicine and three Schools for Advanced Studies. The 
correlation between them is very strong (Spearman  = 0.924), however there are 
numerous universities that shift rank (only 9 out of 64 universities occupy the same 
position in both rankings). The maximum shift is two quartiles, occurring in two cases, 
with the largest leaps equaling 42.8 (UNIV_43) and 38.1 (UNIV_2) percentiles, while 
the average is 7.8%. UNIV_43 presents a very low TS ratio ranking, 59 out of 64. This 
low ratio does not jeopardize its rank (32) by the average productivity of all its 
professors (FSSU), revealing a low dispersion of performance among the faculty. The 
opposite is true for UNIV_2, whereby the high share of TSs (rank = 9) cannot make up 
for the comparably lower productivity of the rest of the faculty (overall rank by FSSU = 
33), revealing a high dispersion of performance. For 50 universities there were no shifts 
in quartile. 
 
Table 5: Ranking lists of Italian universities by TS ratio and by FSSU 
University Research staff TS ratio Rank FSS Rank Rank shift Percentile shift Quartile shift 
UNIV_64 68 48.5% 1 3.081 1 0 0.0 0 
UNIV_6 61 36.1% 2 1.763 2 0 0.0 0 
UNIV_8 57 29.8% 3 1.659 4 1 1.6 0 
UNIV_7 39 28.2% 4 1.735 3 1 1.6 0 
UNIV_45 239 19.7% 5 1.257 6 1 1.7 0 
UNIV_34 1473 16.2% 6 1.233 7 1 1.7 0 
UNIV_10 100 16.0% 7 1.409 5 2 3.1 0 
UNIV_18 165 15.2% 8 1.135 10 2 3.2 0 
UNIV_2 48 14.6% 9 0.883 33 24 38.1 2 
UNIV_49 371 14.3% 10 1.166 8 2 3.1 0 
UNIV_26 173 13.9% 11 1.001 19 8 12.7 1 
UNIV_44 1177 13.8% 12 1.084 12 0 0.0 0 
UNIV_29 1528 13.4% 13 1.136 9 4 6.3 0 
UNIV_12 806 13.4% 14 1.023 16 2 3.3 0 
UNIV_4 948 13.4% 15 1.095 11 4 6.3 0 
UNIV_30 445 13.3% 16 1.016 17 1 1.6 1 
UNIV_56 1695 13.2% 17 1.032 14 3 4.7 1 
UNIV_55 276 13.0% 18 0.919 26 8 12.7 0 
UNIV_51 164 12.8% 19 0.967 20 1 1.6 0 
UNIV_22 412 12.6% 20 0.909 28 8 12.7 0 
UNIV_59 450 12.4% 21 0.942 23 2 3.3 0 
UNIV_15 270 11.9% 22 1.035 13 9 14.2 1 
UNIV_5 652 11.7% 23 0.893 31 8 12.8 0 
UNIV_16 114 11.4% 24 0.935 24 0 0.1 0 
UNIV_60 1099 11.4% 25 0.898 29 4 6.4 0 
UNIV_25 1216 11.3% 26 0.950 21 5 7.9 0 
UNIV_14 205 11.2% 27 0.942 22 5 7.9 0 
UNIV_62 429 10.7% 28 0.934 25 3 4.8 0 
UNIV_54 480 10.6% 29 1.006 18 11 17.4 0 
UNIV_61 464 10.3% 30 1.029 15 15 23.7 1 
UNIV_37 689 10.3% 31 0.909 27 4 6.3 0 
UNIV_53 278 10.1% 32 0.835 35 3 4.8 1 
UNIV_46 439 10.0% 33 0.725 48 15 23.9 0 
UNIV_38 785 9.3% 34 0.897 30 4 6.3 1 
UNIV_40 1007 9.2% 35 0.802 37 2 3.2 0 
UNIV_31 604 9.1% 36 0.823 36 0 0.0 0 
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University Research staff TS ratio Rank FSS Rank Rank shift Percentile shift Quartile shift 
UNIV_42 521 9.0% 37 0.796 38 1 1.7 0 
UNIV_27 922 8.9% 38 0.761 43 5 8.0 0 
UNIV_47 417 8.4% 39 0.847 34 5 7.9 0 
UNIV_32 1853 8.3% 40 0.784 41 1 1.6 0 
UNIV_58 985 8.1% 41 0.720 51 10 15.9 1 
UNIV_52 148 8.1% 42 0.785 40 2 3.1 0 
UNIV_39 2642 7.8% 43 0.740 47 4 6.4 0 
UNIV_9 660 7.7% 44 0.752 44 0 0.0 0 
UNIV_24 119 7.6% 45 0.789 39 6 9.4 0 
UNIV_20 990 7.2% 46 0.748 46 0 0.1 0 
UNIV_36 710 7.0% 47 0.723 50 3 4.8 1 
UNIV_35 1089 7.0% 48 0.696 52 4 6.4 1 
UNIV_28 842 6.9% 49 0.621 59 10 15.9 0 
UNIV_23 640 6.7% 50 0.618 60 10 15.9 0 
UNIV_1 31 6.5% 51 0.639 57 6 9.5 0 
UNIV_48 149 6.0% 52 0.748 45 7 11.1 1 
UNIV_50 334 5.4% 53 0.771 42 11 17.4 1 
UNIV_17 246 5.3% 54 0.624 58 4 6.4 0 
UNIV_41 424 5.0% 55 0.573 61 6 9.6 0 
UNIV_21 81 4.9% 56 0.725 49 7 11.1 0 
UNIV_3 256 4.7% 57 0.678 54 3 4.7 0 
UNIV_57 239 4.6% 58 0.650 56 2 3.1 0 
UNIV_43 94 4.3% 59 0.885 32 27 42.8 2 
UNIV_13 145 4.1% 60 0.539 63 3 4.8 0 
UNIV_33 133 3.8% 61 0.653 55 6 9.4 0 
UNIV_19 453 3.8% 62 0.546 62 0 0.1 0 
UNIV_11 118 3.4% 63 0.695 53 10 15.8 0 
UNIV_63 35 2.9% 64 0.340 64 0 0.0 0 
 
Table 6 presents the descriptive statistics of the quantile shifts and the correlation 
between rankings by TS ratio and by FSSU in each UDA. The last row shows values 
referring to all Italian universities without distinction per UDA. As expected, correlation 
between rankings is very strong in each UDA: the minimum Spearman coefficient of 
correlation (0.766) occurs in Chemistry (UDA 3) and the maximum (0.922) in Medicine 
(UDA 6). The largest percentage of universities shifting rank (97%) occurs in Earth 
Sciences (UDA 4) and Agricultural and veterinary sciences (UDA 7). Chemistry (UDA 
3) registers the highest average percentile shift (15.4), while the maximum (61.9) occurs 
in Physics (UDA 2). In Chemistry, 50% of universities experience a quartile shift. The 
maximum quartile shift equals 2 for all UDAs with only one exception recorded for 
Medicine (UDA 6) where 12 out of 42 universities (or 29%) shift to a nearby quartile. 
 
Table 6: Descriptive statistics of quantile shifts and correlation between university rankings by TS ratio 
and by FSSU  
UDA* 
N. of 
universities 
Shifting 
in rank 
Average 
percentile shift 
Max percentile 
shift 
Shifting 
quartile  
Max quartile 
shift 
Spearman 
correlation 
1 50 94% 13.1 49.0 38% 2 0.847 
2 43 88% 13.8 61.9 42% 2 0.779 
3 42 93% 15.4 51.2 50% 2 0.766 
4 31 97% 14.7 46.7 35% 2 0.816 
5 53 89% 11.0 48.1 34% 2 0.870 
6 42 93% 8.7 29.3 29% 1 0.922 
7 29 97% 13.2 35.7 45% 2 0.861 
8 36 92% 11.9 34.3 25% 2 0.878 
9 49 73% 8.8 47.9 31% 2 0.892 
12 
All 64 86% 7.8 42.8 22% 2 0.924 
* 1 = Mathematics and computer science; 2 = Physics; 3 = Chemistry; 4 = Earth sciences; 5 = Biology; 
6 = Medicine; 7 = Agricultural and veterinary sciences; 8 = Civil engineering; 9 = Industrial and 
information engineering 
 
The scatter plot of Figure 3 positions each university in terms of percentiles by TS 
ratio and FSSU. Because top scientists have a very high effect on the overall rank by 
FSSU of a university (Abramo et al., 2013a), one expects that all universities fall either 
in the bottom-left quadrant or in the top-right one. The scatter plot helps to visualize 
anomalous occurrences. Three outliers (triangles) can be observed near the lines of the 
median values. Starting from the left side of the graph their position could be explained 
as follows. The position of UNIV_43 (7.9; 50.7) ranking just above the median by FSSU 
and among the bottom 10% by TS ratio, reveals that the productivity of its faculty is 
rather homogeneous. The opposite must be true for the UNIV_2 (87.3; 49.2), in the 
mirror position along the FSSU median: a high number of low and unproductive 
performers must offset the high contribution to the overall performance of a very high 
number of TSs. UNIV_46 (49.2; 25.3) positioned around the TS ratios median, must 
employ a very high number of professors whose productivity is far below the median. 
 
 
Figure 3: Scatter plot of universities by their percentile ranks by FSSU and TS ratio 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In all productive sectors, competition is the lifeblood of continuous improvement 
and an unequalled stimulus in the search for excellence. Long-standing successful 
organizations are those that have developed the ability to attract and retain top players. 
The ratio of TSs to the overall faculty of a university can therefore be an indicator of the 
competitive strength of the university in the market for education. Up to 80% of world 
TSs in large research fields work in the top research institutions (Yang et al., 2015), 
which are concentrated in nations where competition among universities is strong. In 
non-competitive higher education systems, the research performance of universities is 
generally little differentiated. Because TSs contribute more than low performers in 
determining the position of universities in performance ranking lists (Abramo et al., 
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2013a), one expects that in non-competitive higher education systems the TSs will be 
rather evenly distributed among universities. In this study we confirm this expectation 
for the case of Italy. The differences in the ratios of TSs out of the overall faculty are 
negligible for all Italian universities, except for the three Schools for Advanced Studies 
and a private university focused in medicine, which outperform all others. Needless to 
say, these four universities are the ones that enjoy the highest reputation in the country 
in their respective educational programs, and are much sought out by prospective 
students. 
As expected, the correlation between the ranking lists by ratio of TSs and average 
productivity is found to be very strong in all disciplines of the Sciences: universities 
which rank high by productivity are those which show also the higher TS ratios. Very 
few outliers escape this rule. One university in particular presents a very high ratio of 
TSs, but where their contribution to the average performance of the university is offset 
by a high ratio of low and unproductive performers. This instance is a paradox from a 
managerial standpoint and would prompt a case study to further investigate the issue. 
We have also found that the variability of TS ratios across SDSs and UDAs within 
single universities is very much higher than between the universities. These findings 
align with those referring to the variability of average productivity of overall academic 
staff within and between universities (Abramo et al., 2014). 
The investigation also showed that there are no returns of TS ratio to size, which 
means that the size of universities does not favor or disfavor the emergence of TSs. 
Future research on the topic might concern a comparison of the results for the Italian 
case with those for a country with a competitive higher education system. 
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